ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on the question of why Popper has not offered “an accurate analysis” of the transition from the closed to the open society, connecting this failure with his model of human action. In this line of reasoning, the chapter argues that the definition of critical rationalism, in terms of “an irrational” faith in reason, is the major cause of an under – theorization of the role of critical rationality in Popper’s model of action. To satisfy these arguments, the chapter proceeds in three sections. It begins with the question of how theories of knowledge and rationality shape the model of human action. Inspired by the answer to these questions, the chapter then offers an exploration of how Popper’s model of action affects his analysis of the transition from the closed to the open society. Finally, it presents my criticism of Popper’s analysis of the transition. Briefly, this chapter concludes that the model of action, in which the concept of “rationality” is defined based on the notion of “irrational faith in reason”, cannot lead us to realize how critical rationality contributes to the transition from the closed to the open society. The difficulty in Popper’s analysis of the transition originates in a justificational approach to the concept of critical rationality according to which the role of reason in human action would not be explainable. An irrational faith in reason cannot lead us to the actor’s cognitive capacity which enables him to question the dogmatic values and institutions of the closed society due to their untenable premises.
