ABSTRACT
Methodological behaviorism is not a thesis about what such common-sense terms mean; rather, it is a recommendation for how the science of psychology ought to be pursued. Methodological behaviorism argues that a scientific psychology should avoid talking about beliefs and desires precisely because they are inner states. In this chapter, the author divides methodological behaviorism into a negative and a positive thesis. Skinner's first objection to mentalistic explanation is that beliefs and desires aren't observable. Skinner believes that the claims of science must be testable by observation; hence, he concludes, the mentalistic thesis does not deserve to be part of a scientific psychology. Environmental determinism is the view that genetic differences do not help explain any behavioral differences. In conclusion, there are two kinds of questions that methodological behaviorism can’t address. The first is the kind of question typified by the robbery example. Second, there is the idea of genetic causes of behavior.
