ABSTRACT
The cultural endorsement and eventual repudiation of footbinding in China was governed by transformative social, political, and economic processes. Footbinding was a measure of control and was seen not only as a sign of honour, identity, and distinction, but also manual skill, fertility, and modesty. It thus changed into an institution that not only fulfilled several functions but was also affected by collective and individual perceptions and actions.
This chapter introduces the reader to (classic) non-cooperative game theory and studies some of the aforementioned aspects of footbinding as well as other forms of interaction. It discusses the essential concepts necessary for modelling individual choices which depend on expectations about others. It further analyses the role of social preferences and how norms and punishment can affect social contracts.
Among the concepts discussed are: payoffs and strategies, normal and extensive form games, Nash equilibria, focal points, pooling and separating equilibria, social preferences, and strategic complements and substitutes.
The final section of this chapter critically examines the underlying assumptions of non-cooperative game theory, in particular the axioms of rationality and the assumptions about expectations and reasoning.
