ABSTRACT
This chapter considers the hypothesis that phenomenology can provide dynamical constraints on dynamical-mechanistic models in cognitive science. It is argued that dynamical and mechanistic explanatory frameworks are complementary rather than opposed to one another and that hybrid dynamical-mechanistic models should be popular in cognitive (neuro)science. In this context, consideration is given to the application of dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology. In particular, neurophenomenological studies of epilepsy are discussed and compared with dynamical-mechanistic models of epileptic seizures. The application of dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology is limited to dynamical descriptions of the prodromal experience of the preictal phase. Thus, neurophenomenology provides dynamical constraints that are merely conceptual. Finally, a revision of the dynamical aspect of the neurophenomenological method is considered in order to provide stronger constraints and build a formal dynamical model of the experiences in question.
