ABSTRACT
Naturalism is of the first kind, emotivism of the second. Naturalism takes seriously what appear to be moral statements; emotivism takes seriously other items in the list, such as the frowns and raised eyebrows. Intuitionism is, of course a – indeed the – non-reductionist theory. Superficialy it has a certain appeal. Naturalism is the attempt to find such a property; emotivism is one result of failing to find it. Non-naturalism is metaphysically embarrassing, because it involves peculiar properties, not accessible to ordinary methods of observation or reasoning, and accessible only to a peculiar kind of faculty, which is itself totally inaccessible to ordinary psychological investigation. Naturalism has a superficially plausible account: if two people are arguing about whether a certain state of affairs is good or bad, it is just possible that one of them has detected certain empirically available features of the situation, while the other has made a mistake because of faulty observation or reasoning.
