ABSTRACT
Chapter 6 analyzes the case of Sri Lanka, widely known as an example of Chinese debt trap but also illustrative of the perfect fit between the BRI and the political needs and economic ambitions of an authoritarian regime. Incentives used in China’s very successful socialization process included massive arms sales that allowed the Rajapaksa regime to win a civil war and thus legitimized its rule; the illegal financing of an electoral campaign; protection against international inquiries on war crimes; and massive loans to finance President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s formidable appetite for ‘vanity’ infrastructure projects. The latter led to overindebtedness, which eventually was used as an effective instrument to put pressure on unfriendly leaders. In terms of approach, political and material costs were diminished by limiting the socialization efforts to the ruling extended family. This backfired when the Rajapaksas lost power. The 2015–2019 period was representative of the serious obstacles encountered by the BRI due to the Sino-Indian rivalry. Non-socialized Sri Lankan elites in power were split between a pro-Indian camp and one that did choose China, but only due to purely strategic calculation reasons. However, the recent return to power of the Rajapaksa family is likely to restore socialization-based cooperation.
