ABSTRACT
The author argues that state efforts to protect the environment are largely shaped by two dimensions: political incentives and administrative capacities. The author constructs a typology of states based on these two dimensions, and suggests hypotheses for behavioral patterns of four types of states (progressives, strugglers, delayers, and regressives). After discussing the distribution of states across this typology and regional patterns, the author examines how the structure of political incentives and administrative capacities correlates with particular types of states, and then tests hypotheses related to pollution concentrations. Findings indicate that progressive states, with both high incentives and capacities, enjoy much lower levels of pollution than other types of states, especially regressive states, with both low incentives and capacities. The author also examines whether political incentives and administrative capacities are independent constructs and determines that, while interrelated, there is no causal relationship and they do not explain the same variance in pollution concentrations. Finally, the author offers a brief thought experiment that explores how this typology may lead to strategic thinking about changing state environmental policy behaviors.
