ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses two instances in which moral 'oughts' might be involved. The first concerns the Kantian dictum 'ought', which epistemically implies 'can' via 'is'. The problem of validating moral 'oughts' are dealt with from a slightly different aspect and the arguments are re-cast in a different logical mould — this time in the form of the traditional syllogism. The main opponent to the thesis about the possibility of moral discourse being rational and critical is assumed to be the subscribers of the Naturalistic Fallacy. The strategies, positive and negative, pursued in meeting the challenge they present consist of making clear the inconsistencies and absurdities to which they would be led by the meta-ethics which they hold. One dimension of moral progress may be said to be the progressive realisation in human history that the scope of morality includes (at least) the whole human race (some argue that the limit should not be drawn there, otherwise, it is mere speceism).
