ABSTRACT
This chapter provides an in-depth investigation of the causes and consequences of Russian nuclear possession and disarmament, in order to further assess the explanatory power of institutional democratisation in relation to mainstream and realist approaches. It would appear that the opportunities for institutional democratisation in this case are thus far more limited than in the US because Russia begins from a less conducive starting point. The chapter investigates the various economic, political and social drivers of Russian nuclear possession in the post-Cold War era and outlines the changing role and importance of nuclear weapons in Russia’s domestic and international politics. Sceptics may use such data to support their claim that the domestic political barriers to nuclear disarmament in Russia are too high for this project to succeed in the near future. The preceding analysis suggests that the principal significance of Gorbachev for this study was his attempt to exert political control over nuclear weapons decision-making, hitherto dominated by military-industrial interests.
