ABSTRACT
In recent years there has been a welcome reawakening of philosophical interest in the emotions. A significant number of contemporary philosophers have now addressed themselves to questions about the nature of emotions, and about how emotions affect our powers of agency – topics that were dealt with earlier by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, and other philosophical luminaries. This general neglect of the moral importance of emotions by contemporary moral philosophy seems largely due to two major influences: the predominance of Kantianism, with the devaluation of the emotions which such an approach typically involves; and a preoccupation with moral action. However, establishing a plausible theory of emotion is just a beginning towards a proper understanding of their distinctive moral significance. The author argument would however be incomplete without a consideration of the Kantian position on the question of morality and the emotions, for Kantianism is well-known for its opposition to allowing emotions a prominent place in our moral lives.
