ABSTRACT
Can the US unilaterally determine currency manipulation by another State, and impose sanctions based on such a finding? Can the US impose macroeconomic conditions on States which it perceives are manipulating their currencies? Can the US engage in surveillance of the currency exchange and macroeconomic policies of its trading partners, solely based on a certain level of export threshold to the US? In so doing, is the US undermining the ability of the IMF to oversee the international monetary system? Is the US imposing quantitative restrictions contrary to WTO disciplines, on countries which export beyond a certain threshold of exports of goods to the US, by specifically targeting them for surveillance and sanctions? In the light of this, the chapter considers US surveillance of foreign currency manipulation and macroeconomic policies (mainly developed countries), conducted under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, and the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015.
