ABSTRACT
Moral obligations, according to Clarke, owe their existence to the fact that certain kinds of conduct are fitting or suitable, unfitting or unsuitable, to certain situations; and this fittingness or unfittingness depends on certain necessary relations which exist independently of any divine or human regulation. That there are ‘eternal and necessary differences of things’ which result in the moral suitability of certain kinds of conduct and the unsuitability of others is, Clarke thinks, perfectly obvious to any fairly intelligent and unbiased observer. Clarke is not always careful enough to distinguish the absurdity of denying that there are any moral principles ‘in nature’ from the absurdity of actually believing in some erroneous principles. Clarke overlooks the fact that the unjust man does not always, and certainly need not, believe that those who behave unjustly towards him are acting unreasonably, however annoyed he may be at their conduct.
