ABSTRACT
Beyond the Russian-Jewish problem, the leaders of the American Jewish Committee (AJC) lobbied to gain something for themselves as well. In its first highly publicized venture into the public arena all of these lobbying devices were of value to the AJC. Naturally, Marshall, Schiff, and the AJC were elated by the abrogation victory and expected that negotiations would soon begin on a new treaty, which would affirm America’s position on expatriation and free travel in Russia. But in the euphoria of victory, Marshall and the others badly misunderstood the course of events and the reasons for their success. In fact, the victory actually meant that the AJC had employed skillful techniques and was extremely lucky in the timing of its abrogation campaign. In truth, however, victory came in Congress because it suited the needs of certain politicians and because, at the time, no one but Taft and the State Department cared about maintaining friendly relations with Russia.
