ABSTRACT
Chapter 4 provides the background to the debate over the problem of nondoxastic justification by examining some of the well-known externalist and internalist accounts of perceptual justification. It begins by evaluating Tyler Burge’s externalist account of perceptual justification, which, among other things, introduces a new type of positive epistemic status or warrant, namely, ‘entitlement.’ It will be argued that Burge’s notion of entitlement cannot be of any help in resolving the problem of nondoxastic justification. This chapter also introduces two competing internalist theories, namely, dogmatism (liberalism) and conservatism. Given the existence of different varieties of liberalism and conservatism, a framework is proposed in order to make sense of the differences involved. It will be argued that no theory of justification needs be conservative/liberal tout court. Whether a theory of justification is dogmatist/conservative depends on which dimension of evaluation is taken to be salient. Some of the implications of this finding are then examined.
