ABSTRACT
Material accountancy is the main method the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uses to verify that safeguards agreements are being observed. It could obviously be used, in fact it would be essential, if an agreement were reached to cut-off the production of plutonium and uranium for nuclear weapons and to ensure that they were being used only for peaceful purposes. Material accountancy might also be needed to verify an agreement to stop the production of chemical weapons. The IAEA has to apply safeguards only to a single and relatively scarce element, uranium, and to its product, plutonium, as it works its way through one of the two fuel cycles being used today. Containment and surveillance techniques and instruments could be used to help verify measures for nuclear, chemical and biological arms control should this prove necessary. A feature distinguishing nuclear arms control from nuclear safeguards is that major measures of arms control are unlikely to be internationally negotiated and applied.
