ABSTRACT
Stemming from the conception of the organization as a process of actions and decisions, the Theory of Organizational Action developed by Bruno Maggi from the mid-1980s onwards, provides an original interpretation of autonomy, which clarifies how it differs from freedom and discretion. In real organizational processes, the rules always spring partly from heteronomy and partly from autonomy, to an extent depending on the intra-organiza-tional power relationships and relationships of domination that characterize the historical action system. In the search for satisfactory solutions guided by an intentional and bounded rationality, autonomy is expressed both in the choice of appropriate means for pursuing the desired ends, and in changing the goals or sub-goals, i.e., in reframing the problem to reflect the lessons learned with the means chosen earlier. This idea of autonomy can already be found in certain theories that are chiefly oriented towards the logic of closed systems that do not accept uncertainty.
