ABSTRACT
This chapter starts by delving a bit deeper in how capacity gaps keep personalist rulers in power by studying the effects of systemic corruption on societies. Second, it takes a closer look at how grievances (resulting from either a legitimacy or capacity gap) translate into various forms of contestation (non-violent, violent, organized violence), according to different personalist legacies. Afterward it presents a map of possible transition scenarios for personalist regimes (with examples from all Sub Saharan African cases between 1970 and 2020), and describes what are the expected preconditions for democratic or authoritarian, violent or negotiated, and the factors contributing to prolonged personalism and the establishment of vicious circles of personalist rule. Special attention is given to those few successful cases resulting in consolidated democracy (Ghana and Benin), and with process-tracking the chapter illustrates the arduous journey by contrasting them with unsuccessful cases like Malawi, Niger, Car, Madagascar, Togo, Congo (Brazzaville) and Mali. Such comparison puts in perspective the weight of structural factors on post-transition democratization processes.
