ABSTRACT
The invasion of Italy, a speculative, opportunistic adventure, with little thought for the long-term military consequences, took the form it did because of deep Anglo-American strategic differences. The Allies, anxious to prove to Stalin that they were carrying on fighting until the cross-Channel attack could be launched, thought the surrender of Italy would foster a prompt conquest of the peninsula. It was a transitional stage between British domination of grand strategy and the coming American hegemony, supported by the Russians. Marshall had agreed only to an invasion of southern Italy; the rest of the peninsula was to be freed only on the authority of Eisenhower. On 29 September, Cunningham was present on board Nelson when Eisenhower received the formal surrender of Italy from the pro tempore leader, Marshal Badoglio. Shortly after the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement was signed, Cunningham was summoned to London to take over from the dying Dudley Pound as First Sea Lord.
