ABSTRACT
The British were convinced that Mussolini and Hitler would break their words when it suited them to do so, and since the French fleet was the next largest in Europe, with many fine modern units, in enemy hands it could swing the naval balance clearly in favour of the Axis. Cunningham, well aware of Godfroy's adherence to an unbending code of honour, 'intimated most tactfully that it was a case of force majeure' but he was disappointed that Godfroy, after reflection, chose to sink his ships at sea, unless Vichy agreed to demilitarisation. Among Britain's supposed friends in the Mediterranean, Greece was understandably anxious not to provoke Mussolini, while Admiral Kelly in Ankara reported that the Turks had to consider a possible Russian attempt on the Dardanelles. Despite some submarine, anti-submarine, mining, torpedo bomber and reconnaissance successes and the almost unhindered convoys to Libya, the overall Italian position was dire, due in large part to Mussolini's rashness.
