ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses a preliminary methodological question regarding the value of exploring the way in which ideas about privacy might be shaped by the fundamental commitments of various traditions of political thought. It is suggested that thinking about how these commitments might influence the terms in which privacy is defined can help us to make sense of the competing and contradictory claims that can be found in the literature on privacy.
As soon as privacy becomes a matter in respect of which there is disagreement, it is located in the realm of politics. Questions regarding the priority or subordination of privacy and competing interests in any given circumstances can be resolved only by recourse to more abstract moral-political values. In this context, disagreement about the value of privacy may be seen as a manifestation of deep-rooted and entrenched division as to which fundamental moral precepts and political ideals ought to provide the basis for establishing fair terms of social co-operation and the equitable allocation of resources. It is argued that top-down reasoning – recourse to abstract moral and political values – is essential for the development of a comprehensive and coherent account of privacy and its value.
