Hellenistic Exercises of Self-Cultivation

This chapter offers a combined account of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation by comparing the interpretations offered by Nussbaum (4.1), Foucault (4.2), and Hadot (4.3). Although each of these thinkers situate the exercises at the core of their interpretation of Hellenism, they disagree markedly about their nature and function, especially on the extent to which they should be viewed as philosophical. While I only adjudicate between these interpretations on the basis of their internal consistency, comparing them side-by-side provides a comprehensive overview of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation, as well as showing why Hadot and Foucault have most to offer a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. Defending these two thinkers against Nussbaum, Cooper, and other Anglophone detractors reveals three things. First, it shows how pervasive the idea of cultivating the self was in the Hellenistic period, one which was not limited to the extirpation of pathē. Second, my rebuttal of Nussbaum’s targeted attack on Foucault’s interpretation of these exercises shows why we should resist understanding them as narrowly philosophical as they lie on a spectrum comprising bodily and mental exercises. Finally, my defense of Hadot from the attacks of Cooper shows that the Hellenistic conception of practical philosophy was broader than its modern incarnation, which suggests – in the spirit of Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf – that we should be more imaginative about what we consider practical philosophy to be, rather than criticise Francophone thinkers for allegedly straying beyond the bounds of modern moral philosophy. By following the Francophone tradition’s interpretation of the Hellenistic exercises of self-cultivation, we can find the conceptual resources to construct a theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. This will be the task of Part III.