Chapter 8 of Reason and Ethics brings the “what it is like to be an amoralist?” question, first broached in Chapter 7, closer to ground level by considering in greater detail moralist lapses the (ever-aspiring) amoralist is liable to. This is not only a practical problem but could be framed as an objection to amoralism since ethics is inherently practical; so what kind of an ethics would amorality be if it could not be achieved? The rest of the book therefore examines the practicability of amoralism. The author also styles this as the problem of modernity. The conclusion of the present chapter builds on two analogies. The Müller-Lyer illusion of two parallel lines appearing to be of unequal length persists even in full knowledge of their equal length. Just so, moralist feelings are likely to persist even if we become convinced of their illusory nature. However, in both kinds of illusion, we retain the capacity to resist the delusion of believing in the appearance and hence to act on the basis of reality. This process is also likened to the way a yogic meditator ignores distracting thoughts and brings her mind back to a mantra.