ABSTRACT
The most influential school of philosophy in Britain at the present day maintains a certain linguistic doctrine to which I am unable to subscribe. I do not wish to misrepresent this school, but I suppose any opponent of any doctrine is thought to misrepresent it by those who hold it. The doctrine, as I understand it, consists in maintaining that the language of daily life, with words used in their ordinary meanings, suffices for philosophy, which has no need of technical terms or of changes in the signification of common terms. I find myself totally unable to accept this view. I object to it:
Because it is insincere;
Because it is capable of excusing ignorance of mathematics, physics, and neurology in those who have had only a classical education;
Because it is advanced by some in a tone of unctuous rectitude, as if opposition to it were a sin against democracy;
141Because it makes philosophy trivial;
Because it makes almost inevitable the perpetuation among philosophers of the muddle-headedness they have taken over from common sense.
