ABSTRACT
An intercontinental nuclear confrontation has existed for nearly 30 years, since the Soviet Union developed heavy bombers and then intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States. At different times over the years critics of the US government have pointed to a US ‘missile gap’, i.e. an alleged Soviet superiority in intercontinental missile capacity. The difference developing between the Soviet and American strategic nuclear capacities lies in the greater Soviet ability to destroy ICBM sites. The ‘strategic warning’ thus achieved would almost certainly entail preparations on both sides for rapidly implementing a nuclear decision once taken. The Soviets took the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks negotiations seriously, as offering constraints on nuclear escalation and on the risk of nuclear war. There are, of course, many constraints against the use of nuclear weapons other than doubt as to whether one would ‘win’ a nuclear war.
