ABSTRACT
This chapter explores key terms that figure in discussions of the value of life. Thus, first good, better, benefit and conversely, bad, worse, harm. There are many fine distinctions needing to be made here. Later, I consider such terms as interests, well-being, reasons, and moral status. Between these sits a discussion of existence and non-existence. This feeds into important questions about starting new lives. A central concern of the chapter is to insist on the gap between the evaluative and the normative. So, we shouldn’t assume that a good life is a valuable life, or that there are any reasons to start or sustain lives, just because they are, or will be good. Similarly, we shouldn’t assume there are reasons to further a thing’s interests, or promote its well-being. And nor should we assume that if some of the harms that might befall a thing matter, and ought if possible to be prevented, then all of its possible harms matter. What does matter? A sustained discussion of value comes not in this but in the next chapter.
