ABSTRACT
In order to think well about the value of life we need to think well about value. So there is first a consideration of ordinary value talk, focussing on how ‘valued’, ‘valuable’, and ‘a value’ are actually used. Next, I ask about the varieties of things that we might say are valuable, and then about the different kinds of value that are in play. The key distinctions here are between a) subjective and objective values, and then b) intrinsic and instrumental values. These distinctions can be usefully explored by relating them to two writers: Dworkin and Moore. Dworkin tries to make a case for the sanctity of life by linking this to a defensible notion of intrinsic value. His account of intrinsic value, I argue, a) fails to convince and b) fails in any event to support the sanctity view. Moore’s account of intrinsic value is, I claim, similarly problematic. We should, then, reject the view that life is intrinsically valuable. But Dworkin has, along the way, introduced the notion of personal value. There is much more scope here for usefully casting light on the value of life.
