ABSTRACT
We might ask, when is there reason to improve lives, to extend them, or to start them? The last of these questions is the concern of Chapters 5–7. The first two are addressed here. Consider plants. Because they lack sentience so, I claim, there is no reason, for their sakes, to care what happens to them. It is different with animals, including human animals. There is reason here, and for their sakes, to decrease pains and to increase pleasures. But there is a need to attend to details. In some ways, pains matter more than pleasures, and human beings matter more than non-human animals. The bulk of the chapter is, however, concerned with death. I reject the Epicurean contention that death is never bad, but reject as well the standard Deprivation Account of death’s badness. The focus, instead, is on desires. And, in brief, there is usually reason to save the lives of those who, with reason, want to continue to live. Animals, I claim, rarely have such desires, while human beings, at least when they are persons, very often do. So while there is very often reason to protect persons, only rarely is there reason, for their sakes, to prevent animals from suffering a painless death.
