ABSTRACT
This chapter examines five ways in which incomparability can be minimized or obscured. The first two—construction of a value index or a unit scale—impose a linear ordering on a nonlinear value structure, introducing spurious comparability. The third way, advocated by Ruth Chang, concedes that incomparability is genuine, but insists nevertheless that many incomparable value pairs are “on a par,” hence “comparable” in a different way. Upon investigation, however, this purported parity relation remains elusive. The fourth way is the contention championed by John Broome that incomparability, or something like it, is reducible to vagueness. But Broome’s argument is unsound, and there are a variety of ways to see clearly that vagueness and incomparability are distinct. Finally, incomparability can be obscured by certain confusions regarding values and value-bearers. A clear understanding of abstraction helps to sort these confusions out. There is no advantage in obscuring incomparability. We do our best to acknowledge it and find ways to accommodate it.
