ABSTRACT
The chapter defines situational value and situational comparison. It then examines implications of the idea that the value of a situation is the aggregate welfare of its population (the total principle). Analysis reveals many of the implications of this principle, some of them unfamiliar, others—an equality principle of the kind advocated by Peter Singer, for example—quite well known. Derek Parfit’s argument for the repugnant conclusion allegedly refutes the total principle, but it is inconclusive, especially in the context of nonlinear value structures. Moreover, Parfit’s nonidentity problem does not, as he supposes, rule out what he calls “person-affecting” principles, one of which is applicable to nonlinear value structures. Section 8.8 proves the consistency of a broad axiological theory that entails all the principles mentioned above. Subsequent sections critique various alternative principles of situational value, including the average, welfare-equality, and maximin principles and hybrid principles. Larry Temkin’s objections to the principle of transitivity, which constitute a significant challenge to axiology in general and to the particular theory presented here, are examined and refuted. Finally, it emerges that Derek Parfit’s notions of quality and quantity suggest a nonlinear two-dimensional axiology that avoids the repugnant conclusion along lines that he suggested shortly before his death.
