ABSTRACT
The paradox of attrition describes cases where the well-planned military operations run aground not because of defective planning, but because they are well planned. George distinguishes among four strategies of the use of force in international politics. The first strategy is the fait accompli approach. The second strategy, coercive diplomacy, reflects a combination of military moves with diplomatic maneuvers in order to compel the opponent to do something it would not otherwise have done. The third strategy, attrition, is one wherein an actor attempts to wear out an opponent through a static warfare that avoids direct confrontation between mass military forces but entails many minor skirmishes and artillery exchanges, guerrilla warfare, and so forth. The fourth strategy is acceptance of the opponent’s ground rules. There are two key issues that the explanations of the paradox must address. The first concerns the role of politics in this paradox. The second issue concerns the question of planning.
