Introduction

This chapter examines the development of neoconservatism through the lens of the distinctive theory of intelligence associated with the movement. The key primary sources for this are the writings of the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) from the late 1970s onwards.

This literature reflects the origins of neoconservatism in the break-up of Cold War liberalism. An analysis of the CSI’s colloquia shows that they were dominated by defenders of the early Cold War state-private network, notably labour anti-communists and retired Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) counterintelligence and covert action officers.

In opposition to intelligence policies oriented towards détente, the CSI developed a distinctively neoconservative paradigm of intelligence as political warfare, in which intelligence collection and analysis were subordinated to covert action and counterintelligence. This conception of the relationship between the elements of intelligence closely reflected institutional fault lines within the intelligence community in the 1970s.

Support for these policies from Reagan and George W. Bush administrations facilitated the reception of former Cold War liberals and labour anti-communists into the conservative movement, though neoconservatism would retain a bipartisan element.