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Chapter
Differential treatment of end-of-life practices
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Differential treatment of end-of-life practices book
Differential treatment of end-of-life practices
DOI link for Differential treatment of end-of-life practices
Differential treatment of end-of-life practices book
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ABSTRACT
What does ‘suicide’ mean for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961? This is a question that has not been considered by the domestic courts or in the academic literature yet, the answer has profound implications including in terms of the prohibition on discrimination in Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Drawing on coronial and criminal case law, this chapter distils a common law definition of suicide. Based on that definition, a patient's refusal of life-sustaining treatment may constitute suicide for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961 which, given the (generally) absolute protection afforded to a capacitous person's right to refuse such treatment, suggests that English law differentiates between forms of suicide on the basis of the person's medical condition which is a protected characteristic under Article 14. Given the findings in Chapters 4 and 5, that differential treatment cannot be justified and it is, accordingly, arguable that the ban violates Article 14, read together with Articles 2, 3, and/or 8. It is also arguable that the ban has a disproportionately prejudicial effect on individuals who, because of their medical condition/physical disability are unable to die by suicide without assistance and, thus, are forced to resort to starvation and dehydration. In those circumstances, given the findings in Chapters Four and Five, the ban violates Article 14, read together with Articles 2,3, and/or 8. The same reasoning is equally applicable to the prohibition of euthanasia.