ABSTRACT

A claimant may bring an action for unjust enrichment where the defendant has been ‘enriched’ as a result of some ‘unjust factor’ at the claimant’s expense. The academic work done on ‘unjust enrichment’ is a mooted replacement for equity. The judiciary have been less enthusiastic about the scholarly models. That unjust enrichment is a part of English law emerged from the decisions of the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale and in Woolwich v IRC. The intention of its proponents is that this model should replace equity. However, its presence has been on the wane for some time. The role of unjust enrichment as the explanation for a variety of equitable doctrines has been rejected in relation to resulting trusts (in Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington), tracing (in Foskett v McKeown), and knowing receipt (in BCCI v Akindele). The sole outpost of unjust enrichment thinking in a major field of equity has been as an explanation for subrogation – an old equitable doctrine – as held in Guinness Mahon v Kensington.