ABSTRACT
This chapter examines recent arguments for viewing historical knowledge as a subfield of the epistemology of science. The result of such a view is that philosophy of history is cast as only one particular species of the general study of the relationship between evidence and theory in scientific practice. The attempt to delineate a strictly scientific epistemological realm of history was a central part of the program for analytically styled philosophy of history in the 1950–1970s era. This program has been resurrected by contemporary empiricist trends. This chapter argues against the basic ideas of this program through a reassessment of Hayden White’s so-called narrativist philosophy of history. It shows that criticizing the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology in history is an essential and important feature of White’s contribution to the philosophy of history. This feature has been overshadowed by formalist interpretations of White’s narrativism. In conclusion, the chapter shows that White’s concept of prefiguration will fundamentally question the viability of current attempts to develop a purely scientific epistemology of history.
