ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the concept of testimony in historical research. Testimony is a central source of information for historical research. Diaries, letters and eyewitness reports are indispensable material for any historian trying to reconstruct past actions and events. But in what sense is historical knowledge dependent on testimony? The chapter engages this question by examining one of the most important philosophers of history during the twentieth century, R. G. Collingwood, and his controversial account of historical testimony. The aim of the chapter is both to show the errors of previous interpretations of Collingwood by influential philosophers, such as C. A. J. Coady, and to demonstrate the relevance of Collingwood’s account for understanding the role of testimony in the human sciences. In conclusion, the chapter argues that Collingwood spoke of testimony with a specific sense of reliance in mind. This fact is crucial both for accurately understanding Collingwood’s philosophy of history and for understanding the relation between testimony and history as different forms of knowledge.
