ABSTRACT
This chapter examines assertions about the epistemological character of forensic investigation. Many forensic scientists have reflected about the nature and status of their work. They have put forward arguments for what unites the various forms of evidential analysis that may be included under the term ‘forensic science’. The chapter first describes such reflections and outlines how contemporary commentators have sought to engage more closely with various positions drawn from the philosophy of science and epistemology. Interpretations of probability based on Bayes’ theorem have formed the basis for siting the epistemological character of forensic science in certain jurisdictions, including England and Wales. This chapter, however, contrasts these idealized assertions with the practical conduct of forensic investigation. The chapter focuses on a forensic reasoning framework known as case assessment and interpretation (CAI). It suggests that rather than reflecting reasoning, enacting Bayes’ theorem recombines various practices, including statistical analysis and embodied performance, rendering forensic activity as recognizable and accountable.
