ABSTRACT
General Sir John Burgoyne stood on the banks of the Hudson River, which provided an uninterrupted waterway to Albany and New York. Washington would be a ‘blockhead’, he thought, if he did not ignore Sir William Howe and exert his whole force against Burgoyne, or New York. Howe’s sudden earnestness to co-operate with Burgoyne seems strange. While Howe penned up his army in a cul-de-sac, Washington would be free either to move against Burgoyne or to capture New York which Fort Clinton was expected to hold with a ‘damned starved defensive’ and without the means to help Burgoyne, should that become necessary. Howe received Burgoyne’s letter on August 16th, three weeks after he had sailed from New York on his expedition to Philadelphia. Clinton could make an offensive move, if he did not thereby endanger the safety of New York.
