ABSTRACT
This chapter makes an assessment of India’s foreign policy choices and grand strategic preferences in the period 1964–1984 and argues for a broad persistence in preference ranking even in a substantially changed external threat environment and style of political leadership. Leveraging the flexibility of nonalignment as a basic policy, and optimally using “alignment of interest” to pursue national security and prosperity, India tactfully sought assistance from both superpowers without compromising on strategic autonomy.
India’s approach to China dovetailed with the changing geopolitical landscape but broadly displayed a controlled response, often along lines of accommodation, with a simultaneous effort towards defence preparedness and only a minimalist use of force as the last resort. India’s two wars with Pakistan are illustrative of Kautilya’s nuanced approach to making foreign policy choices based on strategic context and a sound cost-benefit analysis. The 1971 war is particularly illustrative of Kautilya’s four methods of politics (upayas) and framework of grand strategy that seamlessly integrates political, economic, and diplomatic means.
