ABSTRACT
The chapter puts the contours of Indian strategic culture to empirical test in the period 1984–1998, an era which was witness to arguably the single most dramatic change internationally, i.e., end of the Cold War, and the most sweeping of economic reforms in India domestically. India’s international behaviour deftly leveraged the policy of nonalignment in pursuance of national interest, without jeopardizing decisional autonomy. The goals of economic modernization and liberalization, on the one hand, and regional security on the other (reminiscent of yogakshema) continued to drive India’s foreign policy choices.
The general trend of mending ties with China was carried forward with much vigour, in line with Kautilyan prudence which prescribes samdhi (making peace) or entering into a negotiated agreement with a co-equal adversary when stability in the neighbourhood is critical for development. However, an accommodationist approach to security problematique did not preclude defence preparedness and enhancement of prakriti aggregate. Instead, it aided it. India “managed” its relations with Pakistan both through dialogue and cooperation and “show of force” when required, in a transformed nature of bilateral conflict – sub-conventional in the shadow of nuclear weapons. India’s grand strategic preferences stayed on course despite the shifting strategic context.
