ABSTRACT
The chapter provides an overview of the important developments in India’s nuclear programme and assesses factors responsible for 1998 tests. As the third step of the research process, it examines India’s Nuclear Doctrine as a sample document from a different time period and strategic context to determine the presence of and congruence between preference rankings discerned from Kautilya’s Arthashastra.
India’s nuclear doctrine is unambiguously accommodationist. It maintains that “bilateral dialogue and negotiations” remain the means to resolve outstanding issues with neighbours. While India would be more secure in a weapons-free world, protection from nuclear threats in the meantime is state’s responsibility. Therefore, realist compulsions are interwoven with idealist goals and are not in contradiction with each other. The nuclear no-first-use and “credible minimum deterrence” tenets of the doctrine highlight its defensive nature and the threat to “massively” retaliate and cause “unacceptable damage” lend to its deterrence credibility. The economic rationale of India’s nuclear posture and the India–US Civil Nuclear Deal toe the Kautilyan line in terms of maximizing gains at least possible risk. The doctrine is indeed a unique blend of political rationality and normativity.
