ABSTRACT
This chapter attempts to clarify what should be understood the terms “dispositional concepts” in law. It tries to identify the conditions relating to the appearance of a new conceptual category. The expression of a disposition as regularity offers, in our opinion, to show the “form of life” inherent in man. Normativity would account for human reality and would be actualised in the form of various regularities. This question of normativity would only reflect the dynamic and causal force of certain human and social dispositions. The normativity of the philosopher must be appreciated from a certain mutation due to the analysis of concepts. Regulism and regularism are finally only a declination of the conception of rules in Searle, which itself opposes constitutive rules and normative rules. Claudine Tiercelin in the elaboration of her “dispositional realism” seeks to demonstrate that our reality, in its use of dispositions, offers them to manifest themselves according to properties that things possess “in power.”
