ABSTRACT
The central question of this book is: what is Plato’s attitude towards truth and falsehood? In this introduction, the authors frame this issue by discussing the debate between W. K. Clifford and William James over the ethics of belief. Contra Clifford, James argues that sometimes practical norms override epistemic norms, and thus sometimes we ought to risk falsehood by believing according to insufficient evidence. The project of the book involves showing that, contrary to standard interpretations, Plato is much closer to James than Clifford. In order to establish this claim, the authors identify three common assumptions about Plato’s attitude towards truth and falsehood: (1) the Absolutist Evaluative Claim, (2) the Epistemic Caution Claim, and (3) the Philosopher Claim. These three claims compose the Alethic Interpretation. Each part of the book aims at undermining one of these claims.
