ABSTRACT
Having shown that Plato thinks that philosophers and non-philosophers can benefit from falsehood, it is reasonable to wonder if the same is true of the gods. Plato offers a unique and interesting denial of divine deception. This chapter argues that in order to properly understand Plato’s view, one must grasp his account of eudaimonistic rationality, friendship, and self-sufficiency: being completely self-sufficient and rationally egoistic, the gods have no reason to engage in the pollution of lying. This discussion not only informs us about Plato’s theological commitments and his notion of friendship, it also helps explain the ethical status of falsehood and deception. While the Alethic Interpretation is correct in holding that some badness inheres in all lies and that falsehood always reveals defectiveness, it is wrong in its assessment of the general human condition (including that of philosopher-rulers and even Socrates himself). To be a human is to require falsehood and deception—this is one of the key respects in which we differ from the gods.
