ABSTRACT
According to the Absolutist Evaluative Claim, Plato holds that truth is always preferable to falsehood. This chapter challenges this claim through an interpretation of Plato’s conception of “genuine falsehoods” and “falsehoods in words” in the Republic (2.382a–d). The authors argue that genuine falsehoods are a restricted class of false beliefs about ethics: they are false beliefs about how one should live and what one should pursue. The authors refer to these beliefs as “ethical commitments.” False ethical commitments are always pernicious because they create and sustain psychological disharmony. In contrast, falsehoods in words are not beliefs but rather lies, and they are beneficial when they prevent wrongdoing and help produce and sustain true ethical commitments. While the lies told by philosopher-rulers are merely falsehoods in words, they do cause citizens to have false beliefs. This is justified because these false beliefs help the citizens arrive at the correct ethical commitments. The authors support this reading by discussing many of the useful false beliefs in the Republic, including the infamous noble lie. The upshot is that the Republic tells strongly against the Absolutist Evaluative Claim and supports a pragmatic interpretation of Plato’s philosophy.
