ABSTRACT
In this chapter, it is first recognized that the genuine features of the mystical experience are of two kinds. The one includes aspects of the experience itself (e.g. pleasant, awful etc.). The other consists of claims about the object or the experience that lies beyond the experiencing subject, much like the visual perception of an object exists independently of the subject that perceives it. The central question then as to whether the aspects or features of the mystical state are valid or not can be unambiguously stated. Second, the truth-value of the features of the experience itself is readily demonstrated. Then, the more difficult question of whether the object of the mystical knowledge is a subjective delusion or whether it exists objectively is addressed. It is there shown that guarding against the intrusion of preconceived notions or world views (discussed in chapter 1) and deciding the issue on the evidence as one would do with any other empirical issue, one ought to accept this claim also as valid.
