ABSTRACT
Chapter 8, “The Moral Argument,” gives a series of arguments for why the moral implications of the two-tiered model of punishment are better than either retributivism or consequentialism on its own. The general justifying aim of punishment is to preserve the public order, so the two-tiered model prohibits punishing people merely for bad characters or for actions that are immoral but not illegal, and it supports proportional retributivism rather than equality retributivism. The justified distribution of punishment is based on desert, so the two-tiered model prohibits framing innocents to achieve some social good. The legislature would not create an institution of punishment that allows the innocent to be framed and the guilty to go free, because such a policy would not preserve the public order. And judges ought to give people what they deserve, not do whatever it takes to achieve some social aim, such as pacifying an angry mob or deterring potential criminals. The two-tiered model also does not endorse a “therapy world” in which no one is held responsible for anything and everyone’s behavior is available to be manipulated.
