ABSTRACT
Chapter 4, “Expressing Resentment: A Defense of Retributivism,” defends an expressivist version of retributivism. Justifications of retributivism often beg the question, refer to intrinsic goods and moral intuition, or appeal to the supposed right to be punished. Some retributivists approvingly equate retribution with vengeance, and they believe that punishment somehow “annuls” a past wrong. A more promising justification appeals to the feeling of resentment, a cognitively rich reactive attitude that someone is responsible for unjustifiably harming, intending to harm, or failing to help someone else. Punishment then serves a symbolic social function by expressing social disapproval, and through that process the community affirms its solidarity with victims, a kind of sympathetic resentment. The community recognizes the harm publicly, agrees that the victim’s resentment is justified, affirms their status as rights-bearing persons who are deserving of protection, asserts that they are part of the community, and demands that offenders be excluded from it to one degree or another, temporarily or permanently, by means of punishment.
