ABSTRACT
This chapter makes proposals for reforming the enforcement regime for breaches of directors' duties in sub–Saharan Africa. It makes a strong case for public enforcement of directors' duties in common law sub-Saharan African countries. It argues that the challenges associated with private enforcement of directors' duties in sub-Saharan Africa justify the introduction of a complementary public enforcement regime. Drawing on the deterrence theory, it crucially argues that public enforcement is justified because it offers superior deterrence to the private enforcement regime. The chapter engages with potential counter arguments to the proposed public enforcement regime. It argues that while the regime is imperfect, it nevertheless provides a good option for securing effective enforcement of directors' duties in the region. Considering the distinctive challenges faced by the judiciary of sub-Saharan African countries, the chapter proposes a public administrative penalty regime. Finally, it provides a blueprint for this administrative penalty regime and argues that given certain conditions, it stands a good chance of securing effective enforcement of directors' duties in sub-Saharan Africa.
