ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that subjective consequentialism is compatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can” and elaborates on the best understanding of subjective consequentialism. Following classical proponents of the subjectivist account of moral duty, such as H.A. Prichard and W.D. Ross, it is argued that subjective consequentialists should accept the Volition Thesis, according to which moral duty ranges over something like attempts or choices. Prichard and Ross also suggested a negative claim: that moral duty does not range over full-blown actions. The negative claim is rejected in the chapter. Subjective consequentialists should accept the Volition Thesis, because doing so enables them to rebut cases that at first glance suggest an incompatibility between subjective consequentialism and “ought” implies “can”. But subjective consequentialists should also accept certain indirect judgements of full-blown actions, according to which the deontic status of full-blown actions is derived from how these actions relate to attempts or choices. These indirect judgements are helpful when it comes to defending the combination of subjective consequentialism and the Volition Thesis against objections that have been raised by Terence McConnell against Prichard’s and Ross’s view.
