ABSTRACT
This chapter introduces and defends a new method for ascertaining whether moral duties are perspective-dependent and applies this method to the debate over objective and subjective consequentialism. The method is called the New Perspective and is a complementary alternative to theory-independent accounts of the perspective-dependence of moral duties. According to the New Perspective, we should ask and answer the question of subjectivism versus objectivism relative to specific moral theories and should let our intuitions in the matter be guided by cases that involve duties that are paradigmatic for the respective moral theory. Cases involve paradigmatic moral duties if and only if the actions they are about seem to have the right-, wrong-, and ought-making features, from the viewpoint of common-sense morality, that actions of this kind are said to have by the respective moral theory. When applied to consequentialism, the chapter argues, only disaster situations involve paradigmatic duties in this sense. The Miners case, which has been discussed by Derek Parfit and more recently received much attention due to an article by Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane, is an instructive disaster situation. The Miners case supports subjective rather than objective consequentialism.
